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Little scholarly attention has been paid to the role of Scots law in the
development of the post-Revolutionary law and legal system of the
United States. This neglect stems largely from the fact that Scots law
has had little apparent permanent influence on American law. However,
during the "formative era of American law" from the Revolution to
the Civil War,' a notable effort to introduce America to civil law
concepts took place.2 Furthermore, the impact of the Scottish enlight-
enment on the fledgling United States in higher education, philosophy,
and medicine is well documented.3 Scottish Enlightenment thought
arguably had a significant impact on the Declaration of Independence,'
which was signed by at least two native-born Scots and an American
who was a graduate of the University of Edinburgh.'
David Hume's political essays on freedom and governance of large
areas are thought to have been influential in framing the Constitution."
Indeed, James Wilson, one of the two principal draftsmen of the
Constitution along with James Madison,7 was a native-born Scot who
was educated at St. Andrews. He was apparently greatly influenced by
the work of such eminent Scots as Thomas Reid, Francis Hutcheson,
and Lord Kames as well as Hume.' Wilson was subsequently appointed
to the Supreme Court and, concurrently, to a law -professorship at the
College of Philadelphia (later to become the University of Pennsylvania),
where he delivered the first lectures on law in the new nation.9
The widespread post-Revolutionary view was that America should
develop a uniquely American jurisprudence, which would be eclectic
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rather than derived solely from the English common law."° For example,
Wilson, in his inaugural lecture, argued for the establishment "of a
separate, an unbiased, and an independent law education" for the
United States."I After the Revolution and culminating with the War of
1812, anti-English feeling or Anglophobia was rampant and resulted
in the passage of a number of state statutes prohibiting the use of
English legal precedents in their judicial proceedings. For example, a
1799 New Jersey statute prohibited the receipt of reading in court of
any British decision rendered after July 4, 1776, while a 1807 Kentucky
statute declared that "records and books containing adjudged cases
in... Great Britain... since the fourth day of July, 1776, shall not be
read or considered as authority in ... the courts of this Common-
wealth 2
Civil law presented the only real alternative to wholesale adoption
of the English common law system. While France was held in high
esteem in the United States due to its support and aid of American
independence, few American lawyers had any knowledge or under-
standing of French or civilian legal systems or the ability to read
French, Latin, or German.' Scots law, a civil law system and thus an
alternative to the common law,'4 could have provided another viable
alternative, or arguably, should have been an influential source for
American law, if Americans had undertaken a rational choice of laws.
Scotland was formally a part of Great Britain as a result of the Union
of 1707 and a number of its intelligentsia were outspoken in their
opposition to the separatist ambitions of the American colonists.'5
Others, such as David Hume and Adam Smith, supported the colonists
from early on. 16 Scottish immigrants were also apparently split in their
allegiance, although the majority were probably Tories or neutrals. 7
Certainly some of the most prominent Scots in America, such as
Witherspoon and Wilson, were patriots."
Thus, while mainstream public opinion in America may have viewed
the Scottish-American population as principally loyalist, probably cre-
ating some antipathy toward Scotland, anti-English feeling was much
more pronounced. No ready explanation for the apparent minimal
influence of Scots law, particularly as opposed to English law, lies there.
Scots law, with its civil law underpinnings and its closer relationship
to French and other Continental legal systems, should have presented
a viable alternative to the common law. Language was not a barrier as
with the Continental systems and Scottish institutional works were
available or attainable. 9
Further, the number of people of Scots birth or descent in the United
States was not insignificant; in 1790, they numbered about 260,000,
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representing about 8.3 percent of the population.2" In Georgia and
North and South Carolina, Scots accounted for about 15 percent of
the population.2 As mentioned previously, some Scots were prominent
lawyers and politicians, and the Scottish Enlightenment was quite
influential in many areas of American cultural and intellectual life.
Given these facts, Scots law appears not to have had a significant
impact on American law, even though America was a new country
with the need to develop a legal system.
To what degree did Scots law influence early American law and why
was this influence not greater? The answer lies within development of
Scottish law and the American pre- and post-Revolutionary legal
climate, but first it is necessary to discuss the tangible evidence of
Scottish and post-Revolutionary American legal involvement.
Evidence of Scots Law in America
The seventeenth century is especially significant in the development
of modem Scots law, due in large measure to the publication of so-
called institutional works (treatises) by Scottish jurists such as Stair
and Mackenzie.22 Institutional works not only gave Scots law form and
substance but also came to be authoritative Scottish legal sources
ranking just after legislation and judicial precedent.23
Interestingly, the works of George Joseph Bell, not those of the more
famous Viscount Stair, seem to have been more widely used in the
early nineteenth-century United States. Bell was the last Scottish writer
to have his work attain institutional status in Scotland.24 The institu-
tional works were not widely available in colonial America:25 There
were more copies in post-Revolutionary America, but no American
editions appeared as with Coke's and Blackstone's works.26 Bell's works
were frequently cited in the first American law treatise, James Kent's
Commentaries on American Law, published in 1826.27 Joseph Story
also made frequent reference to Bell and other Scottish writers such as
Erskine and Stair in his treatises.2"
A brief but mutually solicitous and reverential correspondence be-
tween Bell and Story survives. 9 Story's letter to Bell (written on June
8, 1839, to thank Bell for copies of Bell's most recent works) refers to
his then "liberal use of your own excellent Commentaries on Com-
mercial Law. 30 Story further praises the work: "I have used it constantly
in the preparation of all my works upon topics connected with the law
of contracts, and especially of commercial law, and I have derived
many of the most valuable illustrations from it. I can, therefore, truly
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say that though I have not a personal acquaintance with you, yet I feel
that you are among my most familiar friends" ' Story goes on to
express "surprise as well as... regret" that "Scottish jurisprudence"
was not more influential in England, further remarking that "[on the
subject of international Jurisprudence you have been altogether ahead
of them "'32
Story's letter to Bell next engages in what turns out to be false
prophecy: "In the next age I cannot but doubt, but that in England
and America the writings of Scottish jurists will be as much consulted
and as highly esteemed as are now your authors in the general walks
of literature." While this sentiment may, with hindsight, thought to be
wishful thinking, it vividly illustrates what might have been.
Bell was more frequently cited in the United States Supreme Court
reporters than any other Scottish jurist except Erskine, probably because
of the frequent references to his works by Kent and Story. Beginning
in 1843, 33 there were twelve Supreme Court and two Ohio Supreme
Court citations to Bell.34 Of the U.S. Supreme Court references, only
four were in the Court's opinions, 3 one was in a dissenting opinion,
3 6
and the balance were made by counsel.3 7
There are at least seventeen Supreme Court references to the works
of John Erskine, the most frequently cited of the Scots institutional
writers. Erskine, a Professor of Scots Law at the University of Edinburgh,
preceded Bell and published a work in 1754 entitled The Principles of
the Law of Scotland.38 His most distinguished work, An Institute of the
Law of Scotland, was published posthumously in 1773.39 Erskine's
work was also frequently cited by Kent and Story, probably again
explaining its relative popularity with the American bench and bar.40
Of the citations to Erskine, nine appear in the Court's opinions (with
one additional citation by the Ohio Supreme Court),4 five are attrib-
utable to counsel,42 and two are in the case appendices.43
American judicial citations to other Scots legal scholars are even
sparser. For example, there are apparently only three United States
Supreme Court and one Ohio Supreme Court references to Stair in
the nineteenth century.44 Similarly, only three American judicial ref-
erences can be found to the leading work on Scots criminal law,
Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes written by
David Hume, nephew of the famed philosopher of the same name. 5
The succeeding major work on Scots criminal law, Alison's Principles
of the Criminal Law of Scotland (1832),46 drew almost no notice in
American courts.47
Even more remarkable is the scant attention the American judiciary
paid to Lord Kames's Principles of Equity.48 This work is not strictly
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speaking a legal treatise, but is more theoretical or jurisprudential. It
attracted great attention in the United Kingdom and was well known
to Story, who disagreed with Kames's view that equity should aid in
"correcting, mitigating, or interpreting the law.'49 Among the many
contributions of the work was the first analysis of private international
law from a Scots law perspective.5" It was undoubtedly Kames to whom
Story referred in his letter to Bell when he wrote, "[O]n the subject of
international Jurisprudence you have been altogether ahead of them."'
Yet, in spite of the significance of Kames's work and his reputation as
a leading Enlightenment figure, Principles of Equity is cited in only
four American cases in the nineteenth century.2
Lord Kames also won renown for his Historical Law Tracts, published
in 1758."3 This is a work of comparative legal history with significant
sociological and philosophical underpinnings, which investigates the
divergence of the Scottish and English legal systems."' It had a significant
impact in Britain, on the Continent, and on the thinking of many of
the leaders of the fledgling United States. Thomas Jefferson and John
Adams owned copies and made copious notes in the margins and
introduced major extracts into their own work.55 However, research
has uncovered no American judicial references to it.
While it is perhaps understandable that a broad, non-doctrinal work
such as Historical Law Tracts would have little impact on American
courts, their failure to refer to a large number of traditional, doctrinal
Scottish legal treatises is perplexing. For example, no American judicial
reference is found to the important, late seventeenth-century works of
Sir George Mackenzie. 56 Craig's Jus Feudale has been similarly ignored,
although the fact that it was written in Latin may have had something
to do with it.57 More unexpected is the American courts' omission of
any reference to a number of the leading Scottish legal treatises of the
eighteenth century, including those by Forbes,58 Innes,59 and MacDouall
(Lord Bankton).6' The leading works of nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century Scottish legal scholars have also suffered this fate.61
The paucity of American judicial references to Scottish legal scholars
becomes more significant when compared to the widespread reference
and reliance of American courts on the works of the leading English
jurists such as Blackstone62 and Lord Coke.63 To date, almost 800
federal court opinions and over 1600 state court opinions contain
citations to Blackstone:64 There were references to Blackstone in 82
pre-1900 U.S. Supreme Court cases alone.65 Similarly, there are at least
340 federal court cases with citations to Lord Coke, including well over
100 pre-1900 Supreme Court references.66
A look at the American judicial references to some of the leading
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non-Scottish civilian legal treatises is even more revealing of the
insignificant impact Scots legal scholars had on the American judiciary.
For example, at least 234 American federal court cases have cited or
quoted from the works of Pothier, the famed French civilian scholar
of the eighteenth century;67 similarly, there are 127 federal court
references to Grotius, the Dutch jurist, including 70 pre-1900 Supreme
Court citations.6"
English translations and American editions provided American courts
with a ready access to the works of Continental jurists.69 This factor
does not explain the disparity between citations to Continental and
Scottish jurists, it rather raises the question of why the Scots were not
originally looked to more than their civilian brethren, given the lack
of a language barrier, their significant representation in the American
population, and their acknowledged dramatic influence in other areas
of American development.
Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is one of the few areas in
which some tangible evidence exists of Scots law influence upon
American law. 0 While the Latin designation of the term suggests a
Continental origin, Scotland is the only civil law jurisdiction to which
it has been traced.7 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently recognized
Scotland as the doctrine's founding place.72
The request for dismissal in early Scottish cases was framed as "forum
non competens' which suggested a plea questioning the court's capacity
to deal with the issue before it."" But as early as 1865, it was recognized
that the plea "usually does not mean that the forum is one in which
it is wholly incompetent to deal with the question. The plea has received
a wider significance, and it is frequently stated in reference to cases in
which the court may consider it more proper for the ends of justice
that the parties should seek their remedy in another forum " '74 As a
result, the forum non conveniens term became accepted in Scotland
in the late nineteenth century,75 although the concept was already firmly
engrained in Scottish judicial philosophy.
The forum non conveniens term did not appear in American judicial
opinions until 1917,76 although state courts apparently exercised dis-
cretion to refuse to hear a case as to which they had jurisdiction as
early as 1817,"' and the practice was common in actions in admiralty.78
Blair's 1929 law review article, "The Doctrine of Forum Non Conven-
iens in Anglo-American Law" however, brought the term into common
usage in the United States.79 Thereafter, the Supreme Court identified
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the doctrine by name in 1946,0 although it had by the early 1930s
recognized the discretionary nature of a court's exercise of jurisdiction
in "actions between nonresident foreigners for torts committed in a
foreign country"'" or "where for kindred reasons the litigation can
more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal.' 2
A Scottish influence is apparent in these cases as well as in Blair's
work. For example, in Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 3 the
Supreme Court described and quoted from the leading Scottish case
on forum non conveniens, Socit du Gaz de Paris v. Armateursfran~ais
(as affirmed by the House of Lords)84 as well as a leading British
treatise85 to support the Court's general conclusion that the doctrine is
one of fairness, intended to avoid undue hardship upon one of the
parties who would otherwise be forced to litigate in an inappropriate
forum. 6 In both the seminal Gilbert decision87 and the earlier Canada
Malting opinion,8 the Court referenced the Armateurs case, a leading
English decision, and other sources as authority for the general right
of courts to exercise discretion in declining jurisdiction. However, no
such reference is contained in Koster v. Lumbermans Mutual Casualty
Co., 9 a companion case to Gilbert. Blair recognized the early devel-
opment of forum non conveniens in Scotland, but stops short of stating
that the doctrine originated there. 9 Other commentators have recog-
nized the early Scottish development of the doctrine and have ac-
knowledged their inability to trace it back beyond Scotland.9' However,
their references to Scots law are for instructive and comparative purposes
rather than to document a Scots heritage for the American forum non
conveniens doctrine.92
The use of judicial discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction in
America extends back to the nineteenth century, long before the term
forum non conveniens became frequently used.93 These early decisions
are devoid of any reference to Scottish authorities, 94 leading to the
conclusion that the doctrine developed in a somewhat parallel, but
separate and independent, manner in the two countries.
95
Nineteenth-century American admiralty courts also recognized their
right to refuse jurisdiction in suits involving aliens.96 While the influence
of English cases is apparent in these decisions, they contain no references
to Scottish authorities.97
Blair appears to have been the first to tie the state court and admiralty
practice of sometimes refusing jurisdiction with the Scottish concept
of forum non conveniens. From this we may infer that any Scots
influence upon the American version of the doctrine has taken place
in relatively recent times, rather than in the post-Revolutionary era or
the nineteenth century.98
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The evidence of contemporary influence is slight. It is important to
note that with the exception of admiralty courts and the state courts
in a few states like New York, forum non conveniens was slow to gain
acceptance in the United States.99 The doctrine is well established now
in most states and was codified in section 1404(a) of the 1948 Federal
Judicial Code." However, modem decisions provide little evidence of
Scottish influence.10'
Thus, while American courts and commentators recognize Scotland
as the origin of forum non conveniens, there is little evidence that the
early Scots decisions had a significant influence in the development of
the doctrine in the United States.
Approbate and Reprobate
Under Scots law, one may not accept a deed or legal instrument for
one purpose and reject it for another.' This Scottish concept, generally
referred to as the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, is similar to the
common law doctrine of election.' While the doctrine of election was
almost assuredly derived from the civil law,"°M it is less certain that the
English version came from the Scottish concept of approbate and
reprobate. However, at least one English case strongly suggests this to
be the case. 105
The first reference in this country to a possible Scots law source for
the American doctrine of election was probably the fourth edition of
Bigelow's Law of Estoppel, which was published in 1886.106 In the fifth
edition, published in 1890, the relevant reference to Scots law was
elevated from footnotes to the body of the text."" The sixth edition,
published in 1913, retained the Scots law reference and was thereafter
the source for a significant number of American election cases ac-
knowledging the possible Scots law origin of the doctrine.'0 8 Bigelow's
influence was most pronounced in Virginia, where at least seven cases
cite his Scots law reference.
10 9
Other early twentieth-century cases involving election refer to Scots
law as authority for the doctrine without referring to Bigelow."' Some
opinions"' look to the House of Lords decision in Codrington v.
Codrington, where Lord Cairns noted the similarity of Scots and English
law."2 Still other cases apply the doctrine of approbate and reprobate
without any reference to origin."
3
Nonetheless, Bigelow's treatise and the significant number of election
decisions quoting and citing it suggest that the Scots law of approbate
and reprobate may have significantly influenced American law. A closer
look, however, reveals that Bigelow cited English rather than Scots
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cases."4 Thus, the conduit for the American doctrine of election appears
to be English law, which in turn derived the doctrine from civil law,
although the House of Lords in the 1875 Codrington decision acknowl-
edged its coexistence and similarity with the Scottish concept of
approbate and reprobate." 5 It may be that both the English and Scottish
were independently influenced by Roman law, rather than the English
borrowing from the Scottish. But from the American perspective, at
least American courts were willing to borrow an equitable principle
from what they believed were Scots law sources. However, there is little
or no evidence that American jurists sought independent guidance
from Scots sources; rather it appears that they were content with looking
to English opinions such as Codrington or to Bigelow.
Lord Campbell's Act
Until the passage of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846,116 the common
law of England provided that no living person injured by the wrongful
death of another could recover for that injury. The maxim that the
cause of action died with the deceased was peculiarly English;" 7 Scots
law had recognized wrongful death actions for relatives of the deceased
since the eighteenth century."'
Lord Campbell was a Scot who attained distinction in England,
serving variously as Chancellor of Ireland, Chief Justice on the Queen's
Bench, and Lord Chancellor of Great Britain." 9 The Act bearing his
name has an obvious Scottish heritage since it limited actions to the
loss of a wife, husband, parent or child by a wife, husband, parent, or
child, just as did Scots law.'20 In addition, the Act specifically excluded
Scotland from its coverage, as Scots law already provided a suitable
remedy for wrongful death.' 2 '
The subsequent passage of wrongful death statutes by American
jurisdictions were heavily influenced by Lord Campbell's Act; some
initial adoptions were almost verbatim.'22 Thus, they necessarily in-
corporated Scots law, although again through an English conduit.
At least one American court looked directly to Scots law prior to
legislative passage of Lord Campbell's Act. In Sullivan v. Union Pacific
Ry.,2 the court specifically rejected the reasoning of Baker v. Bolton
and relied on "the civil law, and the French and Scotch law" to provide
for the recovery by a father for the wrongful death of his child. 24
But the influence of Scots law on wrongful death actions pales when
compared with that of English law. Prior to the various passages of
Lord Campbell's Act in the United States, the United States Supreme
Court and most other American courts, with few exceptions, relied
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exclusively on Baker v. Bolton to deny wrongful death actions to close
relatives of the deceased.'25 Lord Campbell's Act ultimately had a
significant impact on American law, but it was an English statute and
was viewed as such, probably with little American knowledge of its
Scottish roots.
Liability from the Game of Golf
Not surprisingly, there is some evidence of Scots law influence on
American law with regard to liability from golfing accidents. It is
surprising, however, that the issue was apparently not considered, or
at least reported, in Scotland until the 1905 Andrew v. Stevenson
decision.'2 6
In that case, the Sheriff's Court held a defendant not liable for
personal injury resulting from a slice shot. The court ruled that a golfer
would not be liable for a missed shot or even a failure to warn unless
the plaintiff was in a position of foreseeable danger. Thus, in general,
mere accidental shots were not sufficient to establish liability.'"
Perhaps due to the paucity of any other authority, American courts
have frequently looked to and followed the Andrew decision.'28 However,
other American decisions involving golfing accidents make no reference
to Scots law.'29
Notice of the Defense of Alibi
Traditionally, at common law all defenses except autrefois acquit,
autrefois convict, and former pardon could be entered generally by an
accused under a plea of not guilty.3 ° Given the lack of pretrial discovery
in criminal cases,' 3 prosecutors found it difficult to prepare their cases
because almost any defense could be asserted at trial without notice.
In addition to the likelihood of surprise, the lack of notice was also
thought to encourage the fabrication of alibis.'32
Scotland had addressed this problem in 1887 by requiring criminal
defendants to provide special notice of anticipated alibi defenses.'33 In
1920 Professor Robert Millar urged, in a seminal article, that the
Scottish practice of notice of alibi be adopted in the United States.'34
It gradually gained acceptance here and by 1942, fourteen states had
adopted some form of the Scottish rule.'35 In 1962, an alibi notice rule
was recommended for inclusion into the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and was finally adopted in 1974.136
Today it is recognized that "American alibi-notice statutes trace their
antecedents to a Scottish law enacted in 1887."'" While this is un-
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doubtedly correct, this legacy is principally the work of an American
scholar who looked to Scotland and thus acted as a needed intermediary
for American courts and legislatures.
Worker's Compensation
In the worker's compensation area there is some evidence, as in the
golf cases, of American courts looking directly to Scottish decisions in
the first decades of this century. In 1923, the Supreme Court looked
to Scottish, American, and English precedents to support its finding of
a causal relationship between employment and an employee's acci-
dent. 3  In addition, some state courts also looked to Scottish authorities
for guidance on the same issue, 139 and a few more referred to Scots
cases concerning the obligation of an injured employee to submit to
appropriate medical care as a condition for compensation.14°
Although one could make a case for a significant Scots law influence
on American worker's compensation law, in reality the influence is
slight. The cases citing Scottish authorities are relatively few and almost
always look to English authority as well. More important, the bulk of
Scottish cases were looked to for their interpretation of the Workman's
Compensation Act of 1897.' 4 This act was a product of the British
Parliament, and there is no evidence that it was peculiarly Scottish.
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A Sketch of the Development of Scots Law
Evidence of other Scots law influence on American law is sparse; 43
it remains to explain the scant attention paid Scots law by early
American lawmakers. A possible starting point is the strong Roman
law influence on the development of Scots law, beginning with the
medieval church and arguably continuing to the present.'" Scotland's
long antagonism to England resulted in its strong resistance to English
common law; Roman law, through the medium of canon law, had
made significant inroads in Scotland by the time of its wars of
independence in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and
the break from England with the signing of the Treaty of Northampton
in 1328.1 '5
Thereafter through the early eighteenth century, it was commonplace
for Scottish law students to be educated on the Continent, initially at
Bologna in the north of Italy, and at Cologne and Louvain, then in
France at Orleans and Avignon until the Reformation, and thereafter
in Holland.'46 Apparently the lack of Scottish universities (St. Andrews,
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the first, was founded in 1413) caused the initial exodus; even after
their establishment, however, Scottish universities were slow to compete
successfully with the legal instruction of the more famous Continental
institutions. "7 It is noteworthy that by the early part of the seventeenth
century, important Scottish legal scholars recognized that Roman law
was the principal source of Scots law.4
The publication of Stair's Institutions of the Law of Scotland in 1681
is the single most significant event in Scottish legal history. "9 It largely
succeeded in making "Scots law into a viable system and is properly
regarded as the true foundation of modem Scots law." 50 Stair cited
Roman sources frequently and was admittedly strongly influenced by
it, though he stopped short of finding it binding in Scotland.' Sir
George MacKenzie, Stair's contemporary, whose own slighter institu-
tional work dealt primarily with criminal law, also viewed Roman law
as the principal source of Scots law.32 Subsequent institutional writers
such as Forbes, Erskine, Bankton, and later Bell also paid homage to
the role of Roman law, although Erskine in particular was disinclined
to overstate its influence.
53
The seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries brought the zenith
of Roman law influence to Scotland, largely because of Stair's work
and the established tradition whereby Scots lawyers were trained on
the Continent."' It is interesting that by the late eighteenth century,
the influence of Scottish institutional works appears to have largely
displaced that of Continental scholars, who were of course civilians as
well. 155
The late eighteenth century also saw a general decline in Roman
influence on Scots law, at least with respect to new doctrine. The
increased industrialization of society coupled with the marked devel-
opment of English law often made resort to English law preferable to
the more archaic Roman system,'56 while the appellate jurisdiction of
civil matters of the House of Lords undoubtedly resulted in an increased
common law influence.' Changes within Scotland apart from the
Industrial Revolution also contributed to the decline in Roman law
influence: The reorganization of the Court of Session (the supreme
central court of Scotland, subject only to the House of Lords) and the
regularization of publication of case reports led to greater reliance on
case precedent and a decrease in the use of the Corpus Juris.5  Outside
of Scotland, the Napoleonic Wars curtailed the study of Scots abroad.
When continental countries subsequently began adopting civil codes,
Scotland did not follow suit. Legal study in Europe thus became less
attractive to Scots after the wars, which gradually reduced the influence
of Continental legal systems in Scotland.
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Roman law remains one of the major historical sources of Scottish
law, although its influence on new law in Scotland is negligible. 59 It is
still a significant part of the curriculum in Scottish law schools and
much of Scots law, such as that on moveable property, delict (tort),
and obligations, retains strong Roman characteristics.' °
The early Scottish resistance to the English common law, while today
diminished, has resulted in the continuation of a distinct Scottish legal
system.'6 This is in sharp contrast to what might have been: but for
"non-legal historico-political factors" England, with "its power and
proximity" and relatively developed legal system would have dominated
the developing Scots law.'62 Armed conflict between the two countries
beginning in the late thirteenth century, coupled with ensuing antipathy
and continuing hostilities, changed the probable course of history and
led the Scots to look to the Continent and to Roman law for their
legal heritage.
Comparison with American Law Development
While England did not enjoy the proximity to America that it did
to Scotland, it certainly exercised considerable authority over its North
American colony, so much so that the colonies eventually rebelled in
open warfare and declared their independence. Unlike the Scots,
however, the Americans failed to reject, at least for a meaningful time
or with sufficient assurance, the English common law and failed to
look to other legal systems for guidance with any real conviction.
Although Scotland and America both experienced strong anti-English
feelings and both engaged in armed conflict with England, the parallel
cannot be taken too far in comparing the two countries' receptivity to
English law. England, after all, colonized America and successfully
introduced the common law to the colonies at the earliest stages of the
development of a legal system there.'63 In contrast, Scotland's hostilities
with England began at a time when it had an immature legal system,
causing the Scots to look elsewhere for legal guidance as their society
and thus their need for a system of laws advanced."6
Thus, although colonial America was a new country at the time of
the American Revolution in 1776, it was a more modem society, and
likely had a more evolved legal system than fourteenth-century Scotland
did. Whereas displacement of a significant existing English law influence
would have been necessary in post-Revolutionary America, there existed
no English law influence in Scotland at the time Scottish-English
hostilities began.
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The common law legacy in the United States is undoubtedly due in
no small part to the common law foundation laid prior to the American
Revolution. 65 New or poorly developed legal systems borrow from
others older and more mature. 66 In colonial America, as with colonies
throughout history, the colonizer's legal system was the initial, and thus
most important, source for law.
The Insignificance of Scots Law
Nonetheless, immediate post-Revolutionary America faced a signif-
icant legal vacuum: Colonial law had produced no case reports or state
precedents, American law treatises did not exist, and so few copies of
English legal treatises were available that many courts had no access
to them.7 There was also a desire to develop a responsive and
"American" legal system during a time when antipathy toward England
and its laws was intense. The opportunity was seemingly present for
competing legal systems, in particular, one might think the English-
language Scots civil law, to play a significant role in filling the void.
The resurgence of the legal profession and the common law in early
nineteenth century America is well chronicled.' Although post-Rev-
olutionary Anglophobia was coupled with distrust of the concept of
law generally, by 1820 both the legal profession and the common law
were entrenched in American society. 69 While civil law was not ignored,
at least by those educated enough to refer to it, its role became more
peripheral as the century wore on. The balance of the nineteenth
century was largely left to the continued growth and refinement of the
"American" common law.
It would appear that the window for significant "foreign" law
ascendency was a thirty- to forty-year period following the Revolution.
Although Kent and Story were well versed in Scots law and made
ample references to the Scottish institutional writers in their own
pathbreaking works, 70 there is little other tangible evidence of Scots
law influence during the post-Revolutionary period in America. Most
of the American case citations to Scottish authorities occur in the latter
half of the nineteenth century, when the courts were likely more
influenced by Kent and Story than by Scottish sources. Kent and Story
themselves, while certainly not strangers to the civil law, both embraced
and promoted the common law as the way to a just society.'
Although the window for Scots law importation in the post-Revo-
lutionary period was real, there appear a number of possible answers
for the scant result. First, Scotland became a minority culture within
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the United Kingdom with the 1707 Union. Within Britain, it appears
that post-Union, English law had a much greater impact on Scotland
than the reverse, largely because of the unified Parliament dominated
by the English." 2 As a result, the exportation of English law as a part
of British imperialism and colonization continued unabated."'
With respect to the American colonies, twelve of the original thirteen
were founded before the Union and were therefore English colonies.
That fact, coupled with the post-Union dominance of English law
within Britain and Britain's legal imperialism policy with regard to its
colonies, strongly suggests that Scots law had little chance to make a
meaningful pre-Revolutionary impact in America. Furthermore, while
a significant minority of Scots emigrated to the American colonies in
the eighteenth century,'74 including professionals (notably physicians),
merchants, and landowners, its attraction for Scottish lawyers was
apparently slight because of the perception that the English common
law predominated and knowledge of Scots law was of no advantage. 175
Of further importance were the Tory politics of many Scottish
transplants during the American Revolution. While those of Scottish
heritage were not Loyalist everywhere, they certainly were in some
parts of the colonies, and the evidence suggests that the Scots were
generally viewed as Tories.' The outspoken opposition to colonial
ambitions of a number of leading intellectuals in Scotland no doubt
contributed to this popular perception.'77
Thus, post-Revolutionary Anglophobia must have embraced, to some
extent, Scotland. In addition, the paucity of Scottish emigrant lawyers
suggests that American jurists may not have understood that Scots law
was a civil law system, different and separate from English law.'78
Although Story and Kent and certainly key figures such as Jefferson,
Hamilton, and James Wilson were knowledgeable about and appreci-
ated the Scots legal system, the relative inaccessibility of Scots law
materials and the few Scots lawyers in America appear to have
significantly impeded the post-Revolutionary acceptance of Scots law.
It may be imprudent to overestimate the legal void that occurred
after the Revolution. Although colonial law varied greatly from colony
to colony, the common law was its foundation and British statutes had
full force and effect throughout. It is important to recall that the
colonists' break with Great Britain was largely fueled by widespread
hostility to British legislation and not by any particular aversion to the
common law.'79 The reaction against the common law occurred after
the Revolution and was part of the general Anglophobia pervading the
new country.
As jurists in America sought to create a distinct American juris-
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prudence, 80 it is not surprising that increasing resort was had to the
common law, if not substantively, then systemically. That is, even if
some of the English common law principles were thought unjust or
nontransferable, American jurists were ingrained and comfortable with
the methodology of the common law. American lawyers at the time of
Independence were unlikely to jettison the legal system that served as
their livelihood. Furthermore, the necessity of having to rely heavily
on a civil code or, as in the case of Scots law, the absence of judicial
precedent and of a developing case law, hindered the acceptance of the
civil law. As American cases were decided, were reported, and became
precedent, the common law system was reaffirmed and meaningful
resort to civil law systems was precluded. As a result, recourse to
established common law principles became commonplace with civil
law authority becoming secondary. Scots law appears to have been lost
in the shuffle.
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72 U.S. 268, 285 (1866); U.S. v. Wood, 39 U.S. 430, 437 (1840); Smith v. Bell, 31 U.S.
68, 75 (1832); U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 162 (1820); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 168 (1803); Chisholm, Ex'r. v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 437 (1793).
66. See, e.g., Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272, 285 (1882); McVeigh v. United States,
78 U.S. 259, 265 (1870); Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 69 U.S. 177, 182 (1864); Roberts v.
Cooper, 61 U.S. 467, 471 (1857); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115, 143-44 (1851).
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67. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 666 (1898); Meyer v.
Richards, 163 U.S. 385, 401 (1896): Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 524 (1896);
Meechan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611, 620 (1892); New Orleans v. Gaines's Administrator,
138 U.S. 595, 608 (1891); Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92, 101
(1890); Henderson v. Wadsworth, 115 U.S. 264, 280 (1885); Jackson v. Ludeling, 99
U.S. 513, 529 (1878); Burbank v. Conrad, 96 U.S. 291, 308 (1877) (dissent).
The number of references to Pothier is somewhat misleading due to a number of
Fifth Circuit diversity cases applying Louisiana law and thus referring liberally to
civilian authorities. See, e.g., Perkins v. EI.E. Corp., 762 E2d 1250, 1261 n.34 (5th Cir.
1985); Celestin v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 387 E2d
539, 541 (5th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 296 E2d
569, 571 n.4 (5th Cir. 1961).
68. See, e.g., Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454, 463 (1878); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S.
532, 540 (187); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 484 (1856); The New Jersey Steam
Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. 344, 415 (1848); United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 68 (1833); Ogden v. Sanders, 25 U.S. 213, 222 (1827); The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 133 (1812); Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S.
369, 371 (1797); Hoare v. Allen, 2 U.S. 102, 109 (1789).
69. See, e.g., R. J. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON MARITIME CONTRACTS OF LETrING
TO HIRE (C. Cushing trans. 1821); idem, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
(W. Evans trans., 3d Amer. ed. 1853). See also Aumann, supra note 2, at 310-11.
70. Forum non conveniens concerns the discretionary power of a court to decline
to exercise jurisdiction that it rightfully has "whenever it appears that the cause before
it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere:' Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929). See also Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) ("The principle.., is simply that a court
may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the
letter of a general venue statute.").
71. See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. REV. 908, 909-11
(1947). One commentator acknowledged that the doctrine was long established in
Scotland and England, but opined that its use was probably borrowed from some
continental legal system. He could point to no evidence, however, that demonstrated
another origin. Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. REV. 867, 881 & n.58
(1935).
72. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981). See also Baltimore
& Ohio R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1941) (Frankfurter J., dissenting) (forum
non conveniens a "manifestation of a civilized judicial system... firmly imbedded in
our law").
73. See Longworth v. Hope, 3 Macph. 1049, 1053 (1865). See also Braucher, supra
note 71, at 909, citing Brown's Trustee v. Palmer, 9 Sess. Cas. 224 (1830); MacMaster
v. MacMaster, 11 Sess. Cas. 685 (1833).
74. Longworth v. Hope, 3 Macph. 1049, 1053 (1865).
75. See, e.g., Lynch v. Stewart, 9 Macph. 860, 862 (1871); Macadam v. Macadam,
11 Macph. 860, 861 (1873); Prescott v. Graham, 20 Scot. L. Rep. 573, 574 (1883); Sim
v. Robinow, 19 Sess. Cas. (4th ser.) 665, 666 (1892). See also A. ANTON, supra note
50, at 148-50.
76. Bagdon v. Phila. & R. C. & I. Co., 178 App. Div. 662, 165 N.Y. Supp. 910 (2d
dept. 1917). See Blair, supra note 70, at 2 n.4.
77. Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1817). See Braucher, supra note 71,
at 914 and Blair, supra note 70.
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78. See Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal
Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1949); Coffey, Jurisdiction over
Foreigners in Admiralty Courts, 13 CALIF. L. REV. 93 (1925).
79. 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929). See Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens,
35 CALIF. L. REV. 380, 388 (1947).
80. Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 551, 553, 554 (1946). See
also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) and Koster v. Lumberman's Mutual
Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
81. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 544 (1931).
82. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 423 (1932).
83. 326 U.S. 549, 555 n.4 (1946).
84. Soci6t6 du Gaz de Paris v. Armateurs frangais, [1926] Sess. Cas. 13 (H.L.).
85. A. GIBB, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JURISDICTION 212-13 (1926).
86. While recognizing the general validity of the doctrine, the Williams Court held
that the district court had applied it improperly on the facts before it. 326 U.S. at 559-
60.
87. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 n.6 (1947).
88. Canada Malting Co., v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 423 n.6 (1932).
89. 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
90. Blair, supra note 70, at 2.
91. Braucher, supra note 71, at 909; Dainow, supra note 71, at 881; Barrett, supra
note 79, at 386-87.
92. See Blair, supra note 70, at 29, 33. Blair seemingly apologizes for his look at
Scottish law, stating "While an examination of Scotch decisions may seem irrelevant
in an article dealing with Anglo-American law, yet the greater vogue of the plea of
forum non conveniens in Scotland than in England... coupled with the natural facility
of Scotch judges for terse generalizations, will, we trust, be accepted as justifications
for the irrelevance:' Id. at 20 n.91. This suggests that he saw no real Scots law influence
in American law as then developed. See also Braucher, supra note 71, at 932; Dainow,
supra note 71, at 881-86.
93. See Blair, supra note 70, at 21-29; Braucher, supra note 71, at 914; Barrett,
supra note 79, at 387.
94. The earliest American cases involved suits between aliens on disputes which
arose abroad, see, e.g., Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134, 7 Am. Dec. 445-(N.Y. 1817);
Great Western Ry. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305 (1869); Johnson v. Dalton, 1 Cow. 543, 13
Am. Dec. 564 (N.Y. 1823). A few nineteenth-century decisions recognized discretion
to refuse jurisdiction where the plaintiff was resident of another state of the United
States, see, e.g., Pierce v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 145 Mass. 56, 12 N.E. 858
(1887); Molony v. Dows, 8 Abb. Pr. 316 (1859); Ferguson v. Neilson, 11 N.Y. Supp.
524 (1890); Morris v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 78 Tex. 17, 14 S.W. 228 (1890).
95. See Barrett, supra note 79, at 387. In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
246, 248 n. 13 (1981) the Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
"originated in Scotland... and became part of the common law of many states:' The
statement appears to be inaccurate to the extent that it suggests Scots law was responsible
for or influenced the state common law development.
96. See Coffey, supra note 78; Bickel, supra note 78; Comment, Admiralty Suits
Involving Foreigners, 31 TEXAS L. REV. 889 (1953).
97. See, e.g., The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (188); Panama R.R. v. Napier Shipping
Co., 166 U.S. 280 (1897); One Hundred & Ninety-four Shawls, Fed. Cas. No. 10,521
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(S.D.N.Y 1848). See Bickel, supra note 78, at 19 (admiralty courts borrowed forum
non conveniens concept from English cases); Coffey, supra note 78, at 94-95.
98. See notes 75-81, supra.
99. One commentator, writing in 1947, stated that only half a dozen states had
then accepted the doctrine while fourteen states had rejected it. The remaining bulk
of state jurisdictions had yet to consider its applicability. Barrett, supra note 79, at
388-89 & n.40-41.
100. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a) (1976). The statute does not replace the doctrine of
forum non conveniens but rather ameliorates its harshness by providing for a change
of venue rather than dismissal of the cause of action where the preferred forum is
another federal court. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955). Dismissal of a
cause of action by a federal court under the traditional doctrine is thus appropriate
only when the preferred forum is a court in a foreign country or a state court. See
Gross v. Owen, 221 E2d 94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (no other federal court available) and
Simon v. Silfen, 247 E Supp. 762, 763 (S.D.N.Y 1965) (parallel state action pending).
See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 90-93 (1985);
Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice? 40
IND. L.J. 99 (1965); Note, Forum Non Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal
Courts, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 377 (1980).
101. See, e.g., Silver v. Great American Ins. Co., 29 N.Y2d 356, 328 N.YS.2d 398,
278 N.E.2d 619 (1972); Thomson v. Continental Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 738, 59 Cal. Rptr.
101, 427 P.2d 765 (1967); Lonergan v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 37 Ill. 2d 599,
229 N.E.2d 536 (1967). Compare Zurick v. Inman, 221 Tenn. 393, 426 S.W.2d 767
(1968) ("The origin of the doctrine is somewhat obscure and from our research it
appears to have originated in Scotland... "'). See also Note, Developments in the Law-
State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 1009 n.648 (1960) (recognizing Scottish
origins of doctrine).
102. 1 BELL'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND 64 sec. 32 (6th ed. 1858).
103. In Codrington v. Codrington, L.R. 7 H.L. 854, 861-62 (1875) Lord Cairns
specifically recognized this commonality when he observed: "By the well-settled doctrine
which is termed in the Scotch law the doctrine of 'approbate' and 'reprobate; and in
our Courts more commonly the doctrine of 'election: where a deed or will professes
to make a general disposition of property for the benefit of a person named in it, such
person cannot accept a benefit under the instrument without at the same time conforming
to all its provisions, and renouncing every right inconsistent with them.'
104. "The doctrine of election, like many other doctrines of equity jurisprudence,
appears to have been derived from the civil law:' J. STORY, supra note 40, at sec. 1078.
105. Justice Chitty, writing in In Re Chesham, 31 Ch.D. 466, 473 (1886), observed
that "[t]he principle on which the doctrine of election is based is that a man shall not
be allowed to approbate and reprobate; that if he approbates he shall do all in his
power to confirm the instrument which he approbates. The consequences of such a
principle cannot be legitimately caried beyond the principle itself; if a man approbates,
his obligation is confined to his adopting the instrument as a whole and abandoning
every right inconsistent with it*'
106. M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL AND ITS APPLICATION
IN PRACTICE ch. 19 (4th ed. 1886). Story recognized the civil law origins of election
but did not specifically identify Scotland as a source. See note 104, supra.
107. M. BIGELOW, supra note 106, at 673 (5th ed. 1890).
108. The most commonly quoted language was: "A party cannot either in the
course of litigation or in dealings in pais, occupy inconsistent positions. Upon that
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rule election is founded: 'a man shall not be allowed; in the language of the Scotch
law, 'to approbate and reprobate: And where a man has an election between several
inconsistent courses of action, he will be confined to that which he first adopts; the
election, if made with knowledge of the facts, is in itself binding...." M. BIGELOW,
supra note 106, at 733 (6th ed. 1913).
Cases citing the "Scotch law" reference in Bigelow's sixth edition include: Brooks
& Co. v. North Carolina Pub. Serv., 37 F2d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 1930); Stroh Brewery
Co. v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 513 E Supp. 827, 834 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Metcalfe Bros.
v. American Mut. Liab. Ins., 484 E Supp. 826, 831 (W.D. Va. 1980); Griley v. Griley,
43 So. 2d 350, 352 (Fla. 1949); Jones v. Neibergall, 42 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 1949);
Arwood v. Hill's Adm'r, 117 S.E. 603, 606 (Ga. Ct. App. 1923); Riley v. Cumberland
& Manchester R. Co., 29 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Ky. 1930); Jones v. Southern Natural Gas, 213
La. 1051, 36 So. 2d 34, 40 (1948); Petillo v. Stein, 42 A.2d 675, 678 (Md. 1945);
Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust, 21 Md. App. 517, 321 A.2d 182, 196 (1974); Mertz
v. Mertz, 311 Mich. 46, 18 N.W2d 271 (1945); Castle v. Tracy, 463 S.W.2d 777, 780
(Mo. 1971); State Ex. Rel. Hilleary & Partners v. Kelly, 448 S.W.2d 926, 931 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1969); United States Nat'l. Bank of Red Lodge v. Chappell, 230 P. 1084, 1088
(Mont. 1924); Tremarco v. Tremarco 174 A. 898, 899 (N.J. 1934); Tate v. Estate of
Dickens, 276 App. Div. 94, 93 N.Y.S. 504, 507 (1949); Pulaski Nat'l. Bank v. Harrell,
203 Va. 227, 123 S.E.2d 382, 387 (1962); Rohana v. Vazzana, 196 Va. 549, 84 S.E.2d
440, 442 (1954); Burch v. Grace St. Bldg. Corp., 191 S.E. 672, 677 (Va. 1937); Dickenson
v. Boyd, 187 S.E. 479, 480 (Va. 1936); Hurley v. Bennett, 176 S.E. 171, 175 (Va. 1934);
Nagle v. Syer, 143 S.E. 690, 692 (Va. 1928); Title Guarantee Trust & Savings Bank v.
Clifton Forge Nat'l. Bank, 140 S.E. 272, 274 (Va. 1927).
109. Pulaski Nat'l Bank, 123 S.E.2d at 387; Rohanna, 84 S.E.2d at 442; Burch, 191
S.E.2d at 677; Dickenson, 187 S.E.2d at 480; Hurley, 176 S.E.2d at 175; Nagle, 143
S.E.2d at 692; Title Guarantee Trust & Savings Bank, 140 S.E.2d at 274.
110. See, e.g., United States National Bank of Red Lodge, 230 P. 1084, 1088 (Mont.
1924). "Now the plaintiff must either ratitfy this transaction in whole or reject it in
whole. It must take the bad with the good; it will not be permitted to blow both hot
and cold. As under the Scots law, [he] will not be permitted to approbate and reprobate."
111. Noyes v. Noyes, 233 Mass. 55, 123 N.E. 395, 396 (1919); Jones v. Neibergall,
42 So. 2d 443 (1949).
112. Codrington v. Codrington, L.R. 7 H.L. 854 (1875). See note 103, supra.
113. Brooks & Co. v. North Carolina Public Service Co. 37 E2d 220, 224 (1930);
Stroh Brewery v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 513 E Supp. 827, 834 (1981); Riley v.
Cumberland & Manchester R.R., 29 S.W.2d 3, 4 (1930).
114. M. BIGELOW, supra note 108, at 732 n.3, citing In re Chesham, 31 Ch. D.
466, 473, Chitty, J; Steward v. Muirhead, 29 N.B. 273, Carter, J.
115. See note 103, supra and accompanying text.
116. The Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93 (1846) (more commonly known
as Lord Campbell's Act).
117. See Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN L. REV. 1043, 1044
(1965).
118. See Clarke v. Carfin Coal Co., (1891) A.C. 412, 418 (Scot) where Lord Watson
noted that "[als a matter of fact, it cannot be disputed that.., for a century past,
actions for solatium and damages have been sustained at the instance of husband,
wife, or legitimate child, in respect of the death of a spouse, a child, or a parent.., in
the law of Scotland?'
119. See L. DENNING, BORROWING FROM SCOTLAND 27 (1963).
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120. A young Lord Campbell, sitting as a law reporter, was forced to report the
controversial Baker v. Bolton decision [(1808) 1 Camp. 493], which ruled that the death
of a human being could not be complained of as an injury and was, thus, not
compensable. According to Lord Denning, Campbell thought the case wrongly decided
and determined to change English law to conform to the Scottish as soon as the
opportunity arose. L. DENNING, supra note 119, at 28-29.
Baker v. Bolton has been roundly criticized by scholars since, among other things,
it makes it more advantageous, from a tort perspective, for a defendant to kill rather
than injure a person. According to Prosser, "Lord Ellenborough [the decision's author],
whose forte was never common sense, held without citing any authority that a husband
had no action for loss of his wife's services through her death...." W, PROSSER, TORTS
901 (4th ed. 1971). See also SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 7 (1966) ("it
is clear that the rule in Baker v. Bolton was not based on precedent or logic").
121. See Morange v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, n.13 [quoting in part from
Admiralty Commissioners v. S.S. Amerika, (1917) A.C. 38, 521. According to Justice
Harlan, "[t]he decisional law of Scotland had long recognized [the] right to recover for
wrongful death; thus, the mischief at which the statute [was] aimed could be cured
without disturbing Scottish law. The Act 'excluded Scotland from its operation because
a sufficient remedy existed there when in England none [had] existed at all.'"
The Scottish position is succinctly stated in Eisten v. North British Ry., 8 Macph.
980, 984, 42 Scot. Jur. 575 (1870) ("It is true that, in the law of Scotland, differing in
that respect from some other systems ofjurisprudence, a claim of this kind is sustained
at the instance of a wife for the death of a husband, a husband for the death of his
wife, a parent for the death of his child, and a child for the death of his parent, where
the death has been caused by delict or culpa").
122. See, e.g., the discussion of the North Carolina "Lord Campbell's Act" in
Hume v. Long, 377 S.E.2d 99, 101 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988). See also Morange v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 390 (1969); Cant v. Bartlett, 440 A.2d 388, 393 (Md.
1982); Goheen v. General Motors Corp., 502 P2d 223, 227 (Ore. 1972); In re Meng,
96 Misc. 126, 159 N.Y.S. 535, 538 (1916).
123. 23 Fed. Cas. 368 (D. Neb. 1874).
124. Id. at 369. Judge Dillon specifically rejected Baker v. Bolton: "Considering
that it is not reasoned and cites no authorities, and the time it was made, and that the
rule it declares is without any reason to support it, my opinion is that it ought not to
be followed in a state where the subject is entirely open for settlement" Id. at 371.
125. Professor Malone has noted that Baker v. Bolton "was consistently ignored in
America until 1848... and during this forty-year interval there was no instance of a
denial of a civil action for wrongful death." However, beginning with Carey v. Berkshire
R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475, 48 Am. Dec. 616 (1848), the trend reversed and Baker
v. Bolton was used to deny actions for wrongful death. Malone, supra note 117, at
1067.
In The Harrisburg v. Rickards, 119 U.S. 199, 205 (1886), the Supreme Court held
that "by common law, no civil action lies for an injury which results in death.... The
only American cases in the common law courts against this rule, to which our attention
has been called, are, Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 1 Am. Dec. 61 (1794); Ford v.
Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (1833); James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162 (1853); Sullivan v. Union
Pacific Ry., 3 Dillon 334 (1874)." The Court then noted that each of these decisions
had been overturned. The Court appears to have missed some earlier precedent. See
Malone, supra note 117, at 1066-67.
In Sullivan v. Union Pacific Ry., 23 Fed. Cas. 368, 371 (D. Neb. 1874) the court
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found "that all the cases, English and American, rest upon the nisi prius decision, in
1808, of Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton." As described above, the court in
rejecting that precedent as "not reasoned" was decidedly in the minority in the United
States in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
126. 13 Scots L.T. 581 (1905). See Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471, 157
A. 10 (1931) where the court noted that "Although the game of golf has been played
for many years by thousands of people, serious accidents to players resulting in litigation
have been so few that there is little in the books to help the court:' Id. at 10-11.
127. 13 Scots L.T. at 581-82. See also, Legal Questions Relating to Golfing and
Golf Courses, 31 Scot. L.R. 194 (1915) (approving of the holding in Andrew).
128. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super 471, 157 A. 10, 11 (1931) ("The
only case in point we have been able to find is that of Andrew v. Stevenson.... We
see no reason.., why these principles should not apply to the instant case."); Strand
v. Conner, 24 Cal. 584, 586 (Cal. D. Ct. App. 1962); Walsh v. Machlin, 128 Conn. 412,
23 A.2d 156, 157 (1941); Hoffman v. Polsky, 368 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo. 1965); Rogers
v. Allis-Chamber Mfg., 153 Ohio St. 513, 92 N.E.2d 677, 682 (1950). See also Williams
v. Woods, 260 Mich. 387, 244 N.W. 490, 491 (1932) (citing Legal Questions Relating
to Golfing and Golf Courses, supra note 127).
129. See, e.g., Buck v. Clauson's Inn at Coonamesset, 211 N.E. 2d 349 (Mass.
1965).
130. See Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL.
Sci. 29 (1964).
131. See generally Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard,
1964 DuKE L.J. 477.
132. See Millar, The Modernation of Criminal Procedure, 11 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 344, 350 (1920) (characterizing alibi defenses as "one of the main
avenues of escape of the guilty").
133. See Epstein, supra note 130, at 29. Scots law now requires a criminal defendant
to specify the alibi "place" at the time in question and requires special notice of other
defenses such as insanity.
134. See Millar, supra note 132, at 351. See also Millar, The Statutory Notice of
Alibi, 24 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 849 (1934).
135. Epstein, supra note 130, at 30 n.16. Representative state rules are collected in
6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW sec. 1855(b) (rev. ed. Chadbourne
1976).
136. See Advisory Committee note, Fed. R. Crim P. 12.1. Rule 12.1 states in
pertinent part:
(a) Notice by Defendant. Upon written demand of the attorney for the government
stating the time, date and place at which the alleged offense was committed, the
defendant shall serve ... upon the attorney for the government a written notice
of the defendant's intention to offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the defendant
shall state the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been
at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses
upon whom the defendant intends to rely to establish such alibi.
137. Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 E2d 913, 916 (7th Cir. 1982).
138. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 425 (1923). The Court cited
and quoted from George Anderson & Co. v. Adamson, 50 Scot. L.R. 855 (1905).
139. See Sebo v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, 216 Mich. 351, 185 N.W. 702, 703 (1921);
Hinchuk v. Smith & Co., 149 Minn. 1, 182 N.W. 622, 623 (1921); Prouse v. Industrial
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Commission, 194 P 625, 626-27 (Cal. 1920); Carleton v. Foundry & Machine Products
Co., 199 Mich. 148, 165 N.W. 816, 817 (1917); In re Heitz, 218 N.Y. 148, 112 N.E.
750, 751 (1916); Spooner v. Detroit Saturday Night Co., 187 Mich. 125, 153 N.W. 657,
659 (1915). See also Reynolds v. Passaic Valley Sewage Com'rs, 20 N.J. Misc. 74, 24
A.2d 531, 534 (1942).
140. See Stump v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Corp., 187 Va. 932, 48 S.E.2d
209, 212 (1948); Kricinovich v. American Car & Foundry Co., 192 Mich. 687, 159
N.W. 362, 364 (1916); Jendrus v. Detroit Steel Products Co., 178 Mich. 265, 144 N.W.
563, 566 (1913).
141. Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, 60 & 61 Vict. ch. 37 (1897).
142. See, e.g., Pease, An English Workman's Remedies for Injuries Received in the
Course of his Employment, at Common Law and By Statute, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 509
(1915).
143. There is some evidence that the holographic will in Virginia, authorized by a
1748 statute, was borrowed from Scots law. It may just as likely have come from
English law, however. See J. McKnight, Legal Persistence and Change, 12-15 (unpub-
lished manuscript).
144. See A. CHITNIS, THE SCOTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 78 (1976); A. WATSON, supra
note 62, at 44. See generally D. M. WALKER, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SCOTLAND, VOl. 1
(1988).
145. The early Roman influence was mostly of a procedural nature. See P. STEIN,
Roman Law in Scotland in Ius ROMANUM MEDII AEVI 107 (1968); A. WATSON, supra
note 62, at 45-46.
146. Id. at 46; Stein, The Influence of Roman Law on the Law of Scotland, 8
JURIDICAL REV. 205, 213-14 (1963).
147. Id; T. B. SMITH, A SHORT COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 21 (1962);
B. SMITH, SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF SCOTS LAW, Stair Soc., vol. 1, at 171.
148. See A. WATSON, supra note 62, at 46-47 quoting T. CRAIG, supra note 57, at
book I, tit. 2, sec. 8 (1655) ("But we in this kingdom are bound by the law of the
Romans in so far as they are in harmony with the laws of nature and right rea-
son.... Here there is an extreme scarcity of written laws and naturally we follow the
Civil Law in most matters') Although Jus Feudale was published in 1655, its author
died in 1608. It is noteworthy that lus Feudale was written in Latin. See also T. HOPE,
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